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Free will skepticism refers to a family of views that all take seriously the
possibility that human beings lack the control in action – i.e., the free
will – required for moral responsibility in a particular but pervasive sense.
This sense is typically set apart by the notion of basic desert and is defined
in terms of the control in action needed for an agent to be truly deserving
of blame and praise, punishment and reward (see, e.g., Pereboom ,
; Levy ; Caruso and Morris ). For agents to be morally
responsible for their actions in this sense is for the actions to be theirs in
such a way that they would deserve to be blamed if they understood that
it was morally wrong, and they would deserve to be praised if they
understood that it was morally exemplary. The desert at issue here is
basic in the sense that the agents would deserve to be blamed or praised
just because they have performed the action, given an understanding of
its moral status, and not, for example, by virtue of consequentialist or
contractualist considerations (Pereboom : ). Accordingly, here we
will understand free will as the control in action required for basic desert
moral responsibility, and free will skepticism as doubt or denial that we
have this sort of control.
Some free will skeptics deny that we are morally responsible in this sense
because they believe it is incoherent or impossible that we satisfy its control
conditions (Strawson , , ). That is, it’s incoherent or
impossible that we have the free will required to be morally responsible
in this sense. Others maintain that, though not incoherent or impossible,
our best philosophical and scientific theories about the word provide
strong and compelling reasons for adopting the skeptical perspective. What
all varieties of free will skepticism share, however, is the belief that the
evidential standard for our having basic desert moral responsibility is not
met, and as a result there is a strong presumption against the legitimacy of
the practices associated with it – such as the reactive attitudes of resent-
ment, indignation, backward-looking blame, and retributive punishment.

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Critics of free will skepticism argue that adopting such a view stands to
have harmful consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society,
morality, meaning, and the law. They contend, for instance, that
relinquishing belief in free will and basic desert moral responsibility
would undermine morality, leave us unable to adequately deal with
criminal behavior, increase antisocial conduct, and destroy meaning in
life. Optimistic free will skeptics respond by arguing that life without free
will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be harmful in these
ways, and may even be beneficial. Prospects of finding meaning in life or
of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for instance, would not be
threatened. They further maintain that morality and moral judgments
would remain intact. And although retributivism and severe punishment,
such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, imposition of sanctions
could serve purposes other than the punishment of the guilty; e.g., it can
be justified by its role in incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterring
offenders.
In this introduction we attempt to provide a brief sketch of the trad-
itional free will debate, define the various positions, and frame the debate
over the practical implications of free will skepticism. We focus especially
on the implications of free will skepticism for the criminal law and the
retributive justification of punishment. We conclude with a summary of
the ten original chapters to follow.
. Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications
Contemporary theories of free will might be divided into two general
categories: those that endorse and those that are skeptical of the claim that
human beings have free will. The former category includes libertarian and
compatibilist accounts of free will, two general views that defend the claim
that we have free will but disagree on its nature or its conditions. The
second category comprises a family of skeptical views that doubt or deny
human free will. The main dividing line between the two pro–free will
positions, libertarianism and compatibilism, is best understood in terms of
the traditional problem of free will and determinism. Determinism, as it is
commonly understood, is the thesis that every event or action, including
human action, is the inevitable result of antecedent circumstances in
accordance with the laws of nature. The traditional problem of free will
and determinism therefore comes in trying to reconcile our intuitive sense
 This section includes some passages from Caruso ().
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of free will with the idea that our choices and actions may be causally
determined by factors over which we have no ultimate control; that is, the
past before we were born and the laws of nature.
Libertarians and compatibilists react to this problem in different ways.
Libertarians acknowledge that, if determinism is true, and all of our
actions were causally determined by antecedent circumstances, we would
lack free will and moral responsibility. Yet they further maintain that at
least some of our choices and actions must be free in the sense that they
are not causally determined. Libertarians therefore reject determinism and
defend an indeterminist conception of free will in order to save what they
maintain are necessary conditions for free will – the ability to do otherwise
in exactly the same set of conditions and/or the idea that we remain, in
some important sense, the ultimate source/originator of action. Compatibi-
lists, on the other hand, set out to defend a conception of free will that can
be reconciled with determinism. They hold that what is of utmost
importance is not the absence of causal determination, but that our
actions are voluntary, free from constraint and compulsion, and caused
in the appropriate way. Different compatibilist accounts spell out require-
ments for free will differently but widely endorsed views single out
responsiveness to reasons or connection of action to what one would
reflectively endorse.
Free will skepticism stands in contrast to these pro–free will positions,
and the skeptical view is the focus of this collection. In the past, the leading
form of skepticism was hard determinism: the view that determinism is
true, and determinism is incompatible with free will either because it
precludes the ability to do otherwise (leeway incompatibilism) or because
it is inconsistent with one’s being the ultimate source of action (source
incompatibilism) – hence, no free will. For hard determinists, libertarian
free will is an impossibility because human actions are part of a fully
deterministic world and compatibilism is operating in bad faith.
Hard determinism had its classic statement in the time when Newtonian
physics reigned supreme and was thought to be deterministic. The
development of quantum mechanics diminished confidence in determin-
ism, for the reason that it has indeterministic interpretations. This is not
to say that determinism has been refuted or falsified by modern physics,
because a number of leading interpretations of quantum mechanics are
consistent with determinism (Lewis ). It is also important to keep in
mind that even if we allow some indeterminacy to exist at the micro-
level – the level studied by quantum mechanics – there would still likely
remain determinism where it matters. As Ted Honderich argues: “At the
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ordinary level of choices and actions, and even ordinary electrochemical
activity in our brains, causal laws govern what happens. It’s all cause and
effect in what you might call real life” (Honderich : ; see also
Honderich ). Nonetheless, most contemporary skeptics tend to
defend positions that are best seen as distinct from, but successors to,
traditional hard determinism.
In recent years, for instance, several philosophers have defended free will
skepticism on grounds that are agnostic about determinism; e.g., Galen
Strawson (), Richard Double (), Saul Smilansky (), Derk
Pereboom (, ), Neil Levy (), Bruce Waller (), and
Gregg Caruso (). Most maintain that, while determinism is incom-
patible with free will and moral responsibility, so too is indeterminism,
especially if it is limited to the sort posited by certain interpretations of
quantum mechanics (Pereboom , ; Caruso ). Others argue
that, regardless of the causal structure of the universe, we lack free will and
moral responsibility because free will is incompatible with the pervasive-
ness of luck (Levy ; Caruso a). Others argue that free will and
ultimate moral responsibility are incoherent concepts, since to be free in
the sense required for ultimate moral responsibly we would have to be
causa sui (or cause of oneself ) and this is impossible (Strawson ,
). Here, for example, is Nietzsche on the causa sui:
 Cf. Balaguer (). But even if some brain processes are indeterministic, it isn’t clear how that
would give us free will. Although free will arguably requires indeterminacy, it also requires significant
control in action, and Balaguer’s view has been criticized for its inability to supply that control (see,
e.g., Pereboom ).
 We’ve included Bruce Waller and Saul Smilansky on this list but it’s important to note how their
views differ from most other skeptics. Waller is a moral responsibility skeptic who wishes to “destroy
moral responsibility, drive a stake in its heart, and bury it at the crossroads” (Waller : viii), yet
he also defends a restorative account of free will that is naturalistic, nonmiraculous, and freed from the
burden of trying to justify moral responsibility (see Waller ). This view differs from the majority
of skeptics who define free will in terms of basic desert moral responsibility and maintain that the
two must stand or fall together (see, e.g., Pereboom , ; Levy ; Caruso ; Strawson
, ; Morris ; Shaw , ch.; Focquaert , ch.; Caruso and Morris ;
Focquaert, Glenn, and Raine ). Saul Smilansky’s () fundamental dualism, on the other
hand, maintains a skepticism about our purportedly commonplace belief in libertarian free will but
he also maintains that compatibilism retains some truth. As Smilansky describes: “I agree with hard
determinists that the absence of libertarian free will is a grave matter, which ought radically to change
our understanding of ourselves, of morality, and of justice. But I also agree with the compatibilists
that it makes sense to speak about ideas such as moral responsibility and desert, even without
libertarian free will (and without recourse to a reductionist transformation of these notions along
consequentialist lines). In a nutshell, . . . ‘forms of life’ based on the compatibilist distinctions about
control are possible and morally required, but are also superficial and deeply problematic in ethical
and personal terms” (Smilansky : ; see also Chapter  [this volume]).
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The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far; it
is a sort of rape and perversion of logic. But the extravagant pride of man
has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with just this
nonsense. The desire for “freedom of the will” in the superlative metaphys-
ical sense, which still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the
half-educated; the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for
one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and
society involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui and, with
more than Baron Munchhausen’s audacity, to pull oneself up into existence
by the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness. (Nietzsche /:
–)
What all these skeptical arguments have in common, and what they share
with classical hard determinism, is the belief that what we do and the way
we are is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control, and because of
this we are not morally responsible for our actions in the basic desert sense.
This is not to say that there are no other conceptions of moral responsi-
bility that can be reconciled with determinism, chance, or luck (see, e.g.,
Pereboom ; Caruso a). Nor is it to deny that there may be good
pragmatic reasons to maintain certain systems of punishment and reward.
Rather, it is to contend that to hold people morally responsible for their
actions in the basic desert sense is fundamentally unfair and unjust because
we lack the control in action that this requires.
In addition to these philosophical arguments, there have also been
recent developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that
have caused some to take free will skepticism seriously – though there is
much controversy regarding these scientific arguments (see Mele ;
Nahmias , ; Levy ; Pereboom and Caruso ). Chief
among these developments have been findings in neuroscience that appear
to indicate that unconscious brain activity causally initiates action prior to
the conscious awareness of the intention to act and recent findings in
psychology and social psychology on automaticity, situationism, and the
adaptive unconscious. Viewed collectively, these developments appear to
indicate that much of what we do takes place at an automatic and unaware
level and that our commonsense belief that we consciously initiate and
control action may be mistaken. They also indicate that the causes that
 See, for example, Libet et al. (); Libet (, ); Soon et al. (); Wegner (); Wegner
and Wheatley (); Bargh (, ); Bargh and Chartrand (); Bargh and Ferguson
(); Wilson (); Nisbett and Wilson (); Doris (). The literature on Social
Intuitionism (e.g., Haidt ) is also sometimes cited in this regard; see Sie () for a brief
discussion of its possible relevance.
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move us are often less transparent to ourselves than we might assume –
diverging in many cases from the conscious reasons we provide to explain
and/or justify our actions. These findings reveal that the higher mental
processes that have traditionally served as quintessential examples of free
will – such as goal pursuits, evaluation and judgment, reasoning and
problem solving, interpersonal behavior, and action initiation and control –
can and often do occur in the absence of conscious choice or guidance
(Bargh and Ferguson : ). They also reveal just how wide open our
internal psychological processes are to the influence of external stimuli and
events in our immediate environment, without knowledge or awareness of
such influence. For many, these findings represent a serious threat to our
everyday folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible
agents, since they indicate that the conscious mind exercises less control
over our behavior than we have traditionally assumed.
Even some compatibilists agree that, because of these behavioral,
cognitive, and neuroscientific findings, “free will is at best an occasional
phenomenon” (Baumeister : ). This is an important concession
because it acknowledges that the threat of shrinking agency, as Thomas
Nadelhoffer () calls it, is a serious one independent of any traditional
concerns over determinism. That is, even if one believes free will and
causal determinism can be reconciled, the deflationary view of conscious-
ness that emerges from these empirical findings must still be confronted,
including the fact that we often lack transparent awareness of our true
motivational states. Such a deflationary view of consciousness is potentially
agency undermining (see, e.g., Davies ; Sie and Wouters ;
Nadelhoffer ; Caruso , , d; King and Carruthers
; Levy ) and must be dealt with independent of, and in addition
to, the traditional compatibilist/incompatibilist debate.
In addition to these specific concerns over conscious volition and the
threat of shrinking agency, there is also the more general insight, more
threatening to agent-causal libertarianism than compatibilism, that, as the
brain sciences progress and we better understand the mechanisms that
undergird human behavior, the more it becomes obvious that we lack what
Tom Clark () calls “soul control.” There is no longer any reason to
believe in a nonphysical self that controls action and is liberated from the
deterministic laws of nature; a little uncaused causer capable of exercising
countercausal free will. While most naturalistically inclined philosophers,
including most compatibilists, have long given up on the idea of soul
control, eliminating such thinking from our folk psychological attitudes
may not be so easy and may come at a cost for some. There is some
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evidence, for example, that we are “natural-born” dualists (Bloom )
and that, at least in the United States, a majority of adults continue to
believe in a nonphysical soul that governs behavior (Nadelhoffer ). To
whatever extent, then, such dualistic thinking is present in our folk
psychological attitudes about free will and moral responsibility, it is likely
to come under pressure and require some revision as the brain sciences
advance and this information reaches the general public.
What, then, would be the consequence of accepting free will skepticism?
What if we came to disbelieve in free will and basic desert moral responsi-
bility? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society,
morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as
human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some maintain? Or
perhaps increase antisocial behavior as some recent studies have suggested
(Vohs and Schooler ; Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall ; cf.
Caruso, Chapter  in this volume)? Or would it rather have a humanizing
effect on our practices and policies, freeing us from the negative effects of
free will belief? These questions are of profound pragmatic importance and
are of interest independent of the metaphysical debate over free will. As
public proclamations of skepticism continue to rise, and as the mass media
continue to run headlines announcing: “Free will is an illusion” and
“Scientists say free will probably doesn’t exist,” we need to ask what
effects this will have on the general public and what the responsibility is
of professionals.
In recent years a small industry has actually grown up around precisely
these questions. In the skeptical community a number of different pos-
itions have been developed and advanced, including Saul Smilansky’s
illusionism (), Thomas Nadelhoffer’s disillusionism (), and the
optimistic skepticism of Derk Pereboom (, a,b, ), Bruce
Waller (), and Gregg D. Caruso (, , b; Pereboom
and Caruso ).
Saul Smilansky, for example, maintains that our commonplace beliefs in
libertarian free will and desert entailing ultimate moral responsibility are
illusions, but he also maintains that if people were to accept this truth there
would be wide-reaching negative intrapersonal and interpersonal conse-
quences. According to Smilansky, “Most people not only believe in actual
 Predicting what revisions will be made is difficult. It’s possible that relinquishing the folk
psychological idea of “soul control” will cause some to accept free will skepticism. But it’s also
possible that some might adopt a free-will-either-way strategy, causing them to accept compatibilism
on pragmatic grounds, fearing the alternative.
 The Chronicle Review (March , ) and Scientific American (April , ) respectively.
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possibilities and the ability to transcend circumstances, but have distinct
and strong beliefs that libertarian free will is a condition for moral
responsibility, which is in turn a condition for just reward and punish-
ment” (Smilansky : –). It would be devastating, he warns, if we
were to destroy such beliefs: “[T]he difficulties caused by the absence of
ultimate-level grounding are likely to be great, generating acute psycho-
logical discomfort for many people and threatening morality—if, that is,
we do not have illusion at our disposal” (Smilansky : ). To avoid
any deleterious social and personal consequences, then, and to prevent the
unraveling of our moral fabric, Smilansky recommends free will illusionism.
According to illusionism, people should be allowed their positive illusion
of libertarian free will and with it ultimate moral responsibility; we should
not take these away from people, and those of us who have already been
disenchanted ought to simply keep the truth to ourselves.
In direct contrast to Smilansky’s illusionism, Thomas Nadelhoffer
defends free will disillusionism: “[T]he view that to the extent that folk
intuitions and beliefs about the nature of human cognition and moral
responsibility are mistaken, philosophers and psychologists ought to do
their part to educate the public – especially when their mistaken beliefs
arguably fuel a number of unhealthy emotions and attitudes such as
revenge, hatred, intolerance, lack of empathy, etc.” (Nadelhoffer :
). According to Nadelhoffer, “humanity must get beyond this mal-
adaptive suit of emotions if we are to survive.” And he adds, “To the extent
that future developments in the sciences of the mind can bring us one step
closer to that goal—by giving us a newfound appreciation for the limits
of human cognition and agency—I welcome them with open arms”
(Nadelhoffer : ).
A policy of disillusionism is also present in the optimistic skepticisms of
Derk Pereboom, Bruce Waller, and Gregg Caruso. Derk Pereboom, for
example, has defended the view that morality, meaning, and value remain
intact even if we are not morally responsible in the basic desert sense, and
furthermore, that adopting this perspective could provide significant bene-
fits for our lives. In Living Without Free Will () and again in Free Will,
Agency, and Meaning in Life (), Pereboom argues that life without free
will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as
many people believe. Prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining
good interpersonal relationships, for example, would not be threatened.
And although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death
penalty, would be ruled out, preventive detention and rehabilitation
programs would be justified (Pereboom , a, ). He also
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contends that relinquishing our belief in free will might well improve our
well-being and our relationships to others since it would tend to eradicate
an often destructive form of moral anger.
Bruce Waller has also made a strong case for the benefits of a world
without moral responsibility (see Waller , , a, b. He cites,
for example, many instances in which moral responsibility practices are
counterproductive from a practical and humanitarian standpoint – notably
in how they stifle personal development, encourage punitive excess in
criminal justice, and perpetuate social and economic inequalities. Waller
suggests that, if we abandon moral responsibility, “we can look more
clearly at the causes and more deeply into the systems that shape individ-
uals and their behavior” (Waller : ), and this will allow us to adopt
more humane and effective interpersonal attitudes and approaches to
education, criminal justice, and social policy. He maintains that, in the
absence of moral responsibility, “it is possible to look more deeply at the
influences of social systems and situations” (Waller : ), to minim-
ize the patent unfairness that luck deals out in life, and to “move beyond
[the harmful effects of] blame and shame” (Waller : ).
Who, then, is correct? What would the consequences of embracing free
will skepticism be for society? And what about the criminal law? Would it
need to be abandoned or drastically revised? These are just some of the
questions this collection promises to explore.
. Free Will and the Criminal Law
One impact the free will debate has already had on criminal law theory is
in relation to the causal theory of excuses. “Excuse” in this context is used in
a broad sense to refer to situations where an agent is considered not to be
blameworthy even though the behavior was prohibited and was not
justified. In the literature on causal theory the term excuse is used to cover
certain defenses that some writers do not regard as true excuses, including
defenses that involve denying that the accused had mens rea or that her
behavior constituted an action, or that the accused possessed the general
capacities necessary to qualify as a moral agent (e.g., Moore ).
According to causal theory, the criminal law presumes that agents generally
have libertarian free will. But the law recognizes that, on some occasions,
 The following writers endorse this view. On English law, see Ashworth stating that “there are a few
defences in which elements of determinism play a significant role (involuntariness, duress, perhaps
insanity)” (Ashworth : ). On North American law, see e.g., Kaye () and Morris ().
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factors outside the agents’ control are either causally sufficient to produce
the agents’ behavior or exert such a heavy causal influence on their conduct
that they are not blameworthy for that conduct. Examples often cited by
the causal theorist include reflex actions and coercion. On such occasions,
the causal theory contends that the law should not hold the agent crimin-
ally responsible and the accused does not deserve punishment.
The opponents of causal theory – compatibilists about criminal law –
vary in their positive accounts of criminal responsibility and excuse, but
they all agree that causal determinism has nothing to do with liability to
retributive punishment (see, e.g., Moore ; Vuoso ; Pillsbury
; Morse ; Horder ; Litton ). “Choice” theorists, for
instance, argue that people are responsible for their choices even if those
choices were the inevitable product of factors beyond their control (Moore
). Behavior is excused if it is not the result of an agent’s choice, or if
the agent was not sane, or not mature enough to be blamed for the choice;
or if the agent made the choice for acceptable reasons, e.g. to avoid a
“substantial evil.” “Character” theorists claim that people are only respon-
sible for actions that reflect their (predetermined) characters. On one
version of this theory, actions do not reflect the agents’ character if they
spring from a desire that the agents do not accept in the light of their value
systems (Tadros ). According to some character theorists, agents may
be excused if their actions do reflect their characters, but do not show their
characters to have unacceptable flaws (Horder ). “Attitude” theorists
claim that people are punished for actions that reflect certain attitudes of
hostility or disrespect, regardless of whether the persons were predeter-
mined by factors outside their control to have those attitudes. On this
theory, people may be excused if their conduct does not in fact express an
unacceptable attitude (because, for instance, it was involuntary) or if they
are not the kind of agents from whom the criminal law demands an
attitude of respect, e.g. an individual incapable of practical reasoning
(Western ; see also Strawson ).
On Scots law, see Gordon stating that, “Voluntary human actions are . . . regarded as themselves
uncaused. This is a necessary inference from the doctrine of freewill; and without some form of that
doctrine, however restricted, there can be no moral responsibility in the sense of praise or blame”
(Gordon : –). He cites coerced and reflex “acts” as instances where behavior is regarded
as a mere effect of prior causes and where the actor is not held legally responsible. However, in an
earlier passage he argues that practices of praise, blame, reward, and punishment can still be justified
even if determinism is true, since such practices can still be an effective means of improving behavior
(Gordon : –). Perhaps the best way of reconciling the two passages is to interpret Gordon
as arguing that without free will there can be no moral responsibility in the sense of praise and blame
without pragmatic justification. On Australian law, see Hodgson ().
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While free will is relevant to the causal theory since, for instance, it
maintains that the culpability of agents is mitigated by circumstances that
constrain free will, the relevance of the free will debate to the criminal law
goes much deeper than this. This is because the criminal law is founded on
the idea that most normal, rational persons can be held morally responsible
for their actions since they have freely chosen them – if this is mistaken,
the entire foundation of the criminal law is defective. The US Supreme
Court, for instance, has asserted:
A “universal and persistent” foundation stone in our system of law, and
particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration,
is the “belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”
Indeed, US courts have observed that, “[t]he whole presupposition of the
criminal law is that most people, most of the time, have free will within
broad limits.” Moreover, “the law has been guided by a robust common
sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the
solution of its problems.” The US Supreme Court, in fact, has gone so
far as to suggest that “a deterministic view of human conduct . . . is
inconsistent with the underlying precepts of our criminal justice system.”
While this last claim is controversial, since some legal scholars claim that
the criminal law only requires compatibilist free will, one thing is clear: if
free will skepticism is correct and agents are never morally responsible in
the basic desert sense, the current American conception of the criminal law
will need to be revised.
Legal punishment consists in the state deliberately harming an individual
in a way that is intended to constitute a fitting response to some offense
and to give expression to the state’s disapproval of that offense (Boonin
; Zimmerman ). One prominent justification for legal punish-
ment is retributivism. The retributivist justification for punishment main-
tains that punishment of wrongdoers is justified for the reason that they
deserve pain, deprivation, or death just because they have knowingly done
wrong; it is the basic desert attached to criminals’ immoral actions alone
 United States v. Grayson,  U.S.  at  (), quoting Morissette v. United States, 
U.S. ,  ().
 Smith v. Amontrout,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ).
 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,  U.S. .  ().
 United States v. Grayson,  U.S.  at  (). See also Bethea v. United States,  A.d , 
n. (D.C. ), which asserts: “the notion that a person’s conduct is a simple function of
extrinsic forces and circumstances over which he has no control is an unacceptable contradiction of
the concept of free will, which is the sin qua non of our criminal justice system.”
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that provides the justification for harming them in such ways. This means
that the retributivist justification for punishment does not appeal to goods
such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of those being
punished.
In the United States, a number of sentencing guidelines have adopted
desert as their distributive principle, and it is increasingly given deference
in the Purposes section of state criminal codes, where it can be the
guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the code’s
provisions. Indeed, the American Law Institute recently revised the
Model Penal Code so as to set desert as the official dominate principle
for sentencing. And courts have identified desert as the guiding principle
in a variety of contexts, as with the Supreme Court’s enthroning
retributivism as the “primary justification for the death penalty”
(Robinson : –).
Legislation in England and Wales and draft sentencing guidelines in
Scotland also list punishment as the first aim in a list of the purposes of
criminal sentencing. Since the other purposes that appear in the list are
forward-looking goals that punishment might seek to achieve (e.g. crime
reduction), commentators have observed that singling out punishment as a
separate aim of sentencing seems to appeal to the retributive idea that
punishment can be an end in itself. It has also been suggested that
placing punishment first in the list implies that it is the most important
aim, even though the legislation and draft guidelines do not explicitly
say that.
Consider, for instance, the American Law Institute’s recent revision of
the Purposes section of the Model Penal Code. The Model Penal Code is
one of the most important developments in American law, and perhaps the
 E.g.,  Pa. Code Sect. . (); see also (Tonry ).
 E.g., Cal. Penal Code Sect. (a)() (West ): “The legislature finds and declares that the
purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”
 E.g., Model Penal Code Sect. .() (Official Draft ).
 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code Sect. .() adopted May , .
 See, for example, the US cases Spaziano v. Florida,  U.S. ,  (); Gregg v. Georgia, 
U.S. , - (); Cotton ().
 Spaziano v. Florida,  U.S. at .
 Criminal Justice Act , s, (a); Scottish Sentencing Council (), Principles and
Purposes of Sentencing. Draft Sentencing Guidelines, (i): www.scottishsentencingcouncil.org
.uk/consultations/principles-and-purposes-of-sentencing/.
 Dingwall ().
 Dingwall (); see also Scottish Sentencing Council (: ), Principles and Purposes
of Sentencing, Consultation Analysis: www.scottishsentencingcouncil.org.uk/consultations/
principles-and-purposes-of-sentencing/.
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most important influence on American criminal law. Conceived as a way
to standardize and organize the often-fragmentary criminal codes enacted
by the states, the Model Penal Code has influenced a large majority of
states to change their laws. While the Model Penal Code is not law and has
no binding effect, it has been the model for many states’ criminal codes
and has been extremely influential on state and local lawmakers.
The new Purposes provision of the Model Penal Code (revised in May
) now states:
§ .(). Purposes; Principles of Construction
() The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all
official actors in the sentencing system, are:
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing of individual offenders:
(i) to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity
proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to
crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders;
(ii) when reasonably feasible, to achieve offender rehabilitation,
general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offenders, res-
toration of crime victims, preservation of families, and reinte-
gration of offenders into the law-abiding community, provided
these goals are pursued within the boundaries of proportionality
in subsection (a)(i);
(iii) to render sentences no more severe than necessary to achieve the
applicable purposes in subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii) . . .
It is the inclusion of ()(a)(i) that colors the entire Model Penal Code and
sets retributivism as the official dominant principle for sentencing. While
()(a)(ii) and ()(a)(iii) are not retributive in nature, they are secondary to
the subsection setting the “blameworthiness of offenders” as the primary
justification for criminal sentencing. Note, first, that retributivism is
to guide sentencing “in all cases,” while rehabilitation, deterrence,
incapacitation, and restorative justice are only to be pursued “when
reasonably feasible.” Second, the provision clearly states that ()(a)(i)
trumps ()(a)(ii) in that the forward-looking, nonretributive approaches
cited in (a)(ii) are only to be pursued “within the boundaries of propor-
tionality in subsection (a)(i).” This amounts to saying that limits to
punishment grounded in retributivism cannot legitimately be overridden
for forward-looking reasons.
The revised Purposes section rests upon the theory of limited
retributivism, setting a maximum and minimum for all sentencing based
upon deontological and retributive principles, and allowing for forward-
looking, nonretributive options only “when reasonably feasible” and
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“within the boundaries of proportionality.” This conflicts with skepticism
about free will for at least two reasons. First, if free will skeptics are correct,
retributive legal punishment is unjustified since, if agents do not deserve
blame just because they have knowingly done wrong, neither do they
deserve punishment just because they have knowingly done wrong
(Pereboom : ). This would remain true whether or not the criminal
law assumes libertarian free will, since free will skepticism also denies that
compatibilism preserves the kind of free will and moral responsibility
needed to justify retributive legal punishment. Thus, upper and lower
bounds on punishment cannot be grounded in retributivist theory.
Commenting on the significance of what free will and moral responsi-
bility skepticism entails, Neil Levy writes:
Traditionally, incarceration is seen as justified, in part, by the desert of
offenders: because they are guilty—morally, and not merely legally, guilty—
we can impose significant sanctions on them; the more weighty the sanc-
tions, the more such a justification is required. . .But if moral responsibility
skeptics are right, agents are never deserving of the imposition of such
sanctions. Thus moral responsibility skepticism has practical implications:
it apparently entails that major elements of the criminal justice system are
unjustified. (Levy : )
By setting desert as the official dominant principle for sentencing, the
Model Penal Code, as well as numerous sentencing guidelines in the
United States, England, Scotland, and elsewhere, has assumed that “most
people, most of the time, have free will within broad limits.” If the
proponents of free will skepticism are correct, this assumption is mistaken.
Furthermore, even if one is not convinced by the arguments for free will
skepticism, it remains unclear whether punishment can be justified on
retributive grounds. This is because the burden of proof lies on those who
want to inflict harm on others to provide good justification for such harm
(Pereboom , ; Shaw ; Corrado ; Caruso c). This
means that retributivists who want to justify legal punishment on the
assumption that agents are free and morally responsible (and hence justly
deserve to suffer for the wrongs they have done) must justify that assump-
tion. And they must justify that assumption in a way that meets a high
epistemic standard of proof since the harms caused in the case of legal
punishment are often quite severe. It is not enough to simply point to the
mere possibility that agents possess libertarian or compatibilist free will.
Nor is it enough to say that the skeptical arguments against free will and
basic desert moral responsibility fail to be conclusive. Rather, a positive
and convincing case must be made that agents are in fact morally
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responsible in the basic desert sense, since it is the backward-looking desert
of agents that retributivists take to justify the harm caused by legal
punishment.
If we accept, then, that we are justified in doubting or denying the
existence of free will and basic desert moral responsibility, as skeptics
contend, a major challenge remains: providing an ethically defensible
and practically workable alternative to retributive legal punishment. It is
exactly this challenge that several of the contributions to this volume
attempt to tackle.
. Overview of Chapters
The collection is divided into three main parts. Part I is concerned with the
possibility and desirability of rejecting the notions of free will, basic desert
moral responsibility, and retribution. Part II takes up the challenge just
mentioned and asks: how can the use of state coercion be justified without
retributivism? Part III discusses some of the needed changes to the criminal
justice system if we adopted free will skepticism.
Part I begins with Saul Smilansky’s (Chapter ) critique of the skeptics’
claim that relinquishing basic desert does not expose us to abuse of the sort
referenced in traditional objections to utilitarianism, such as that it will
justify punishment of the innocent. Smilansky offers seven reasons for
doubting this claim – some philosophical, others more pragmatic. One of
his central contentions is that free will skepticism (or free will denialism, as
he prefers to call it) does not have the philosophical resources to effectively
safeguard human rights and respect for persons in the context of punish-
ment. We should be skeptical of the optimism of free will denialists
concerning the stability of deontological constraints without free will and
moral responsibility. Smilansky concludes that these considerations should
lead us to adopt his fundamental dualism and illusionism.
Contra Smilansky, Gregg D. Caruso argues in Chapter  that we should
instead be optimistic about the implications of free will skepticism. He
considers the practical implications of free will skepticism and discusses
recent empirical work that has just begun to investigate the matter. He
argues that there are good philosophical and empirical reasons for thinking
that belief in free will, rather than providing the pragmatic benefits many
claim, actually has a dark side; i.e., it is too often used to justify punitive
excess in criminal justice, to encourage treating people in severe and
demeaning ways, and to excuse and perpetuate social and economic
inequalities. The problem, he contends, is the belief in just deserts. After
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addressing recent empirical findings in social psychology that purport to
show that diminishing one’s belief in free will increases antisocial behav-
ior – findings he argues are overblown and questionable – he introduces
contrary findings in moral and political psychology that reveal interesting
and troubling correlations between people’s free will beliefs and their other
moral, religious, and political beliefs. He concludes that we would be
better off without the notions of free will and just deserts.
In Chapter , Bruce Waller argues that the desire for retribution runs
deep – its roots are in the same strike-back desire that motivates rats to
attack each other when they are placed in a cage with an electrified grid
and then shocked. Rats, however, “didn’t have anyone around to justify
their strike-back behavior by constructing a system of moral responsibility
and righteous retribution; unfortunately, humans do.” Waller notes that
the primitive strike-back desire is philosophically packaged as righteous
retribution, the essential basis of morality, justice, and human dignity, but
this is because we are stuck within the retributive thought system. We need
to move beyond the retributive system to something that works. And while
we may need the strike-back retributive emotions, we also need ways of
controlling and ultimately reducing them. When the strike-back feelings
linger and fester, they not only block better ways of dealing with the
problem of criminal behavior, they also exact an additional psychological
toll on the crime victim. After examining some of the psychological and
cultural factors that hold the retributive system in place – e.g., belief in a
just world, belief in rugged individualism and self-making, and belief in
moral responsibility – Waller argues that we need to drop the moral
responsibility system altogether and move “beyond blame and shame.”
The path beyond retributivism leads to the search for greater understand-
ing of individual behavior and its causes. He concludes by examining what
direction the criminal justice system might take in a world without moral
responsibility.
Part II of the collection begins with Derk Pereboom’s chapter on free
will skepticism and criminal behavior. In it, he sets out the most recent
version of his free will skeptical position on treatment of criminals, which
combines detention for dangerous criminals by analogy with quarantine
for carriers of dangerous diseases, justified on the basis of the self-defense
right, the attendant special deterrent effect, and restricted general
deterrence (Pereboom , , ). Saul Smilansky contends that
Pereboom relinquishes a traditional safeguard against unjust treatment, the
principle that only the guilty should be punished because only they
basically deserve to be punished. Pereboom agrees that the safeguards his
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view provides are sufficiently robust, and are workable in societies generally
committed to the well-being of its citizens. These safeguards include the
fact that the right to self-defense, on which his quarantine analogy is
founded, is not dependent on basic desert, while it permits harming in
self-defense only those who are evidently an immediate threat. A further
safeguard, the right to liberty, is also not dependent on basic desert. In
addition, there is significant value to basing criminal law in views about
human beings that can be defended, by contrast with concealing, for the
sake of the public good, what one, after serious rational consideration,
believes to be the truth.
In Chapter , Benjamin Vilhauer develops a deontological social
contract approach to punishment that draws on Kantian and Rawlsian
notions of treating criminals as ends by respecting their rational consent to
punishment. In developing his account, he responds to Saul Smilansky’s
objection that free will deniers do not have the philosophical resources to
effectively safeguard human rights and respect for persons in the context of
punishment. Vilhauer agrees that utilitarian approaches to punishment are
problematic for the reasons Smilansky states, but he disagrees with Smi-
lansky that free will deniers are unable to offer a deontological justification
for punishment that respects persons. Vilhauer’s deontological account
draws on a broadly Rawlsian version of the Kantian idea of refraining
from treating people as mere means to ends. He argues that a Rawlsian
social contract theory that models rational consent is perfectly consistent
with free will skepticism and is able to safeguard human rights and respect
for persons – and this is because there is an important moral distinction
between the action-based kind of desert typically at issue in the free will
literature (which is inconsistent with free will skepticism) and personhood-
based desert (which is not). He concludes that free will deniers can justify
punishment despite establishing deontological rights against the unfairness
involved in maximally painful punishment, violations of due process,
and framing.
In Chapter , Kevin Murtagh defends the view that free will skeptics
can endorse general deterrence as a justifiable aim of legal punishment. He
does not claim that it is the justifiable aim, or the main aim, but rather that
it is a justifiable aim among others. He takes as his target Derk Pereboom’s
claim that general deterrence is not a justifiable aim of punishment since it
suffers from the “use” objection, according to which general deterrence is
wrong because it involves harming some, without their consent, in order to
benefit others. Murtagh responds by arguing that the use objection
myopically focuses on only one aspect of a system of general deterrent
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punishment, and that, when we take full account of the complexity of this
sort of punishment within a reasonably just legal system, we can see that it
need not involve an impermissible kind of use. He further argues that
Pereboom’s positive account of how to respond to crime is insufficient for
good social policy. He concludes by offering a sketch of an account that
combines the measures that Pereboom advocates with others designed to
promote general deterrence.
Part III of the book, which focuses on changes to the criminal justice
system, begins in with Michael L. Corrado’s chapter (Chapter ) on
“criminal justice turned upside down.” He begins by noting that those
who reject the notion of moral responsibility seem to fall into one or the
other of two camps: those who prefer to abandon punishment in favor of
preventive techniques – therapy and incapacitation – and those who seek
to justify (nonretributive) punishment nevertheless. Corrado places his
tent on the “fringes of this second camp.” This is because he thinks
punishment is essentially retributive and cannot be justified, but that we
must, if possible, avoid yielding to the preventive worldview. He argues
that by borrowing from punishment its harsh methods we maintain the
dignity of offenders when we subject them to these methods with the aim
of leading them to abandon the defective motivational traits that resulted
in the crimes. He calls his approach “correction” rather than “punish-
ment,” because it lacks the retributive element that makes punishment
punishment. Correction, for Corrado, is the application of harsh treatment
to those who have committed crimes, but it cannot avail itself of the
support of retribution, and therefore requires support of another kind. To
that end, Corrado explores the theory proposed by J.G. Fichte, a theory of
criminal justice without moral presuppositions, and tests the conclusions
of that exploration against the problem presented by psychopaths in
our society.
In Chapter , John Callender examines three clinical cases so as to
provide some real-life illustrations of severe offending and to promote
discussion of the complex issues raised by the cases. These questions are:
How well do legal definitions of insanity map on to the reality of mental
illness? What would be a just outcome in these three cases? What does it
mean to treat someone as a person rather than an object? Is it possible that
treating people as responsible agents promotes injustice by ignoring the very
real constraints faced by many people in conforming their behavior to the
law? And does retributive punishment convert complex human tragedies
into simple dichotomies of good and evil, guilty or innocent, sane or insane,
and right or wrong? Through examining his three case studies, Callender
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argues that, while our retributive impulse may have served the purpose of
regulating social behavior in our evolutionary past, it is one of a range of
instinctive impulses that has outlived its usefulness. It is less easy to justify
anger and revenge when we know that someone is laboring under severe
disabilities in relation to the ability to do what is right. The first case, for
example, provides an illustration of how many offenders are themselves
victims of traumatization. The second case highlights how the concept of
legal insanity is a construct that sometimes maps poorly on the reality of
mental illness and the ways in which this can alter personality and behavior.
In cases such as these, retributive punishment inflicts new harm on already
damaged people. Finally, in the third case, we see how a therapeutic
response aimed at reduction of future harm to the offender and to other
people produced the most humane and effective outcome.
In Chapter , Elizabeth Shaw examines the implications of free will
skepticism for the process of establishing criminal liability in a trial.
Currently, it is a general principle of UK and US law that before a person
can be convicted of a crime the prosecution must prove three things. First,
the accused must have performed the actus reus – the prohibited act.
Second, the prosecution must prove mens rea – a mental state such as
intention or recklessness. Third, the accused must lack a valid defense,
such as self-defense. Shaw argues that these prerequisites for criminal
liability should be retained and she offers a rationale for them that does
not depend on the concepts of free will and retribution – one that appeals
to considerations such as the value of liberty and moral communication.
She concludes that, even if the notions of free will and retributive responsi-
bility were abandoned, the mens rea and actus reus requirements and
various defenses could still be retained. However, some of these legal rules,
as well as the rationale behind them, would need to be revised.
The collection concludes with Farah Focquaert’s chapter (Chapter )
on free will skepticism and criminal punishment. If, as she contends, it is
extremely unlikely that we possess the kind of free will that legitimates
desert-based punishment, then the rationally defensible route is to adopt a
cautionary perspective that draws on non-desert-based criminal justice
procedures that are fair and just to all parties involved. She proceeds to
analyze the options available, which include the following: () we can
acknowledge that we do not have a justification for desert-based moral
responsibility but choose to disregard this knowledge at both trial (deter-
mining guilt versus nonguilt) and sentencing (punishment) phases; () we
can acknowledge this and disregard it at trial but not sentencing phase; ()
we can acknowledge this and take it into account during both the trial and
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sentencing phase. Taking these options into account, she presents a non-
exhaustive list of potential models to effectively address criminal behavior
and critically assesses the most striking difficulties each of these models
faces. She concludes that innovative criminal justice systems need, at the
very least, to continue to identify causal responsibility, promote taking
responsibility for one’s future behavior, and thoroughly respond to victims’
rights and needs. The attribution of moral guilt and the implementation of
desert-based punishment face numerous objections. We need to start a
debate on the desirability of a criminal justice model that focuses on causal
responsibility and taking responsibility; a model, she contends, that aims
to achieve victim recovery, restitution, and restoration by implementing
forward-looking justice mechanisms.
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